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RESUMEN
Se propone una representación bidimensional del espacio de juegos simétricos de
2x2 en su representación estratégica. Esta representación provee una herramienta
para la clasificación de los juegos simétricos de 2x2, cuantificación de la fracción
que tiene una cierta característica, y predicciones sobre los cambios en las carac-
terísticas de un juego cuando se realizan cambios en la matriz de ganancia que lo
define.
ABSTRACT
A bidimensional representation of the space of 2x2 Symmetric Games in the strate-
gic representation is proposed. This representation provides a tool for the classi-
fication of 2x2 symmetric games, quantification of the fraction of them having a
certain feature, and predictions of changes in the characteristics of a game when a
change in done on the payoff matrix that defines it.
PALABRAS CLAVE
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a large amount of investigation on dynamic models based on 2x2 symmetric
nonzero-sum games Lewontin (1961), Vaughan (1995), where a certain payoff, and some
times some uncertainty on it Matsushima (1998) is chosen to construct the model. The
features of the static games defined by the payoff matrices are very important in these
dynamic models Marshall (2003), but so far we lack a complete cartography of the space
of possible payoff matrices to guide our selection for a certain model.
2 SYMMETRIC 2x2 GAMES IN THE STRATEGIC FORM
Among the nonzero sum games, the most simple kind of game is probably the 2x2 sym-
metric with imperfect information. And the most simple way to represent it is the strategic
form introduced in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
a = ({A,B}, {0, 1} ⊗ {0, 1}, $A : {0, 1} ⊗ {0, 1} → R, $B : {0, 1} ⊗ {0, 1} → R) (1)
where a represents the game, {A,B} is the set of players, {0, 1} is the space of strategies
of any of the players, and the composite space {0, 1} ⊗ {0, 1} is the space of positions.
$A and $B are the payoff function for the two players. This is a function that goes from
the space of positions to some ordered set, which is generally Z, the set of the integer
numbers. These payoff functions are sometimes referred as payoff matrices, taking the
labels of the strategies as indexes
(PA)ij = $A(i, j) (2)
In symmetric games, there is a symmetry condition on the payoffs, which ensures equal-
ity of conditions for the two players Weibull (1996). If we interchange players, both the
indexes i, j are interchanged, and the payoff matrices PA, PB are interchanged.
PA = (PB)
t (3)
3 ESSENTIAL AND UNESSENTIAL FEATURES IN THE PAY-
OFF BIMATRIX
An acceptable payoff can be defined in any set with an order relation Heap and Varoufakis (1995),
but it proves to be very useful to define it within a compact set. If we assign a numer-
ical payoff to both players in every choice situation, we need 8 numbers. The con-
dition of symmetry reduces them to 4. But as it was stated in Harsanyi (1980) and
Luce and Raiffa (1965), the properties of the game cannot depend either on the value
of payoff represented by number 0 (additive invariance), or an overall factor in the scale
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of payoffs shared by both players (scale invariance). There are, then, two parameters
that can be ruled out, and we are left with only two numbers.
Let’s represent the payoff matrices for A and B in the following way:
PA =
(
a b
c d
)
PB =
(
a c
b d
)
(4)
The mean of this numbers is irrelevant (additive invariance), so can substract it from the
four parameters (that is a′ = a − 1
4
(a + b + c + d)) and the properties of the game are
preserved.
We can also use the scale invariance to take rid of the overall scale considering
(a’,b’,c’,d’) as a vector in R4 and normalizing. (a′′ = a′/norm(a′, b′, c′, d′)).
To make the two relevant parameters explicit, we choose a SO(4) transformation wich
takes a′′ into 1
2
(a′′+ b′′+ c′′+d′′) wich we know is always zero, and get, for example,these
new parameters:
(G0, GA, GB, GAB) = (a, b, c, d)
1
2


1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1

 (5)
As it was stated above, G0 is allways zero, but GA is the difference between the expected
payoffs of each player if the other player chooses 0 y 1 with equal probability. GB is
the difference in the other player ’s payoffs if each player plays an uniform distribution of
probabilities 0 and 1. GAB is the payoff difference between the two symmetric situations
(A choosing the same as B)
4 GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION
Normalization made the vector (GA, GB , GAB) unitary, and therefore we have a repre-
sentation of the space of relevant parameters as the surface of a sphere.
The conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria and Pareto Optimal conditions are
sets of inequalities involving these three parameters. Each inequality defines a plane in
the parameter state that cuts the sphere in a certain way.
Every possible game in the considered type, defined by a payoff matrix, has a “nor-
malized” representative in the surface of the sphere (except for the trivial one with the
same payoff for any situation). The fraction of surface of the unit sphere enclosed by
the planes corresponding to the conditions is exactly the fraction of the possible
games set wich fulfills those conditions.
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5 NASH EQUILIBRIA (NE)
The definition for a Nash Equilibrium (NE from now on) is simple: if both player decrease
their payoff departing individually from a certain choice condition, then this condition is a
NE.?)
For example, the position(i∗,j∗) is a NE iff:
∀(k, l)ǫ{positions} Pi∗j∗ > Pkj∗ and Pi∗j∗ > Pi∗l (6)
In a symmetric game, the existence of a pure strategy NE is guaranteed Owen (1968a),
and this makes things easier. A Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium will correspond to a
maximum payoff in a column of player A’s payoff matrix and a maximum payoff in a row
of player B’s payoff matrix. In terms of the parameters defined in 5:
(−1)i(GA + (−1)
jGAB) > 0
(−1)j(GA + (−1)
iGAB) > 0
(7)
Where the indexes i and j can take values within the set of strategies {0, 1}. A remarkable
feature of these conditions is that they only involve the parameters GA and GAB . They
are completely insensitive to GB , the average difference in payoff owed to a change in
the other player strategy.
5.1 Symmetric positions
For the symmetric positions (i=j) it is easily seen that both conditions are the same:
(−1)i(GA + (−1)
iGAB) > 0 (8)
This condition will be fulfilled for half the possible games, for it defines a plane that cuts
the sphere in two halves, both for (1 − i)(1 − j) = 1 and ij = 1. The planes defined by
the condition “00 is NE” and “11 is NE” are orthogonal, and that allows us to infer that 1
4
of the games will have only (0,0) as a Nash equilibrium, 1
4
of the games will have (1,1) as
a Nash equilibrium and 1
4
of the games will have both positions as Nash equilibria.
5.2 Nonsymmetric positions
For nonsymmetric positions 01 and 10 the conditions 7 are different (s1 = 1, s2 = −s3)
from each other, and define, again, perpendicular planes:
(−1)iGA −GAB > 0
(−1)jGA −GAB > 0
(9)
However, the conditions are identical for position 01 and for position 10. This means that
If one nonsymmetric position is NE, the other is NE too.
4
5.3 ZONES IN THE G SPACE
In figure 1 three zones in the space of arameters GAB and GA are shown that are sepa-
rated by the Nash Equilibrium Conditions.
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00 is
Nash equilibrium
11 is
Nash equilibrium
00 and 11
are NE
01 and 10
are NE
Figure 1: Zones with different NE in the G parameters space
6 PARETO OPTIMAL POSITIONS (PO)
A position is Pareto-optimal (PO from now on) when each player can improve his payoff,
but doing so, he diminishes the other player’s payoff Owen (1968b).
One of the conditions for a certain choice situation to be a PO is clearly that it is not
a NE. The other, concerning the other player’s payoff maximization, can be viewed as
the NE condition on the transposed payoff matrix. Transposing payoff matrix amounts to
interchanging GA and GB , so we already have them:
s1GB + s2GAB > 0
s1GB + s3GAB > 0
(10)
6.1 The geometric complete picture
NE conditions generates planes defined by (GA±GAB = 0), and OP conditions generate
planes defined by (GB ± GAB = 0). To achieve some symmetry in our partition of the
sphere we need to cut the sphere with the plane (GA ± GB = 0) as well. This involves
comparing one diagonal element of the payoff matrix with the other diagonal element,
and comparing one nondiagonal element with the other nondiagonal element.
We cut the sphere with three pairs of orthogonal planes, getting 24 identical regions,
which will allow us to compute easily the fraction of the sphere corresponding to certain
5
GA
GB
GAB
GA
GB
GAB
Figure 2: Partition of the unit sphere
set of such NE or PO conditions. Every region of the sphere characterized by NE and OP
conditions will be conformed by some of these 24 small curve “triangles”, which we will
call elementary regions from now on They are shown in figure 2.
If we choose the greatest absolute value as the norm instead of the euclidean norm,
the space of possible games is projected into the surface of the unit cube.
The Nash and Pareto conditions will cut this cube in a very symmetrical way, as they
did to the sphere. It becomes apparent then that all the elementary regions are alike.
In figure 3 this partition of the cube is shown, together with the unfolded surface as it is
going to be presented later. In the central square GAB > 0, while in the square formed
by the four extreme triangles of the unfolded cube GAB < 0
GG BA
Figure 3: Partition of the unit cube, and its unfolded form
7 A classification of 2x2 nonzero sum symmetric games
We can see the EN conditions affecting GAB and GA and the PO conditions affecting
GAB and GB as classification criteria, meaning the following for a certain position:
• If the position is NE it means that each player gets a maximum payoff for himself.
• If the position is PO it means that each player produces a maximum payoff for the
other player.
6
The importance of the first criteria is evident by itself, but the other criteria becomes
important in cooperative game Owen (1968c) where players are allow to interact before
choosing, or in dynamic games, where in some cases players learn that it can be advan-
tageous to behave “generously” Possajennikov (2002).
Normally the PO definition include the inverse of the NE condition (the PO payoff must
be susceptible to be raised by any player) Owen (1968b). But here we are going to try a
less restrictive approach, taking the conditions on the transpose of the payoff matrices as
independent from the conditions of the actual payoff matrix.
Using these NE and PO conditions independently we can assign each region of the
sphere a certain kind of game . The NE and PO planes cut the sphere into 12 regions,
with 3 different sizes. There are 8 triangular (elementary) regions covering each 1
24
of
the sphere, 4 bigger triangular regions covering each 1
12
of the sphere (conformed by two
elementary regions), and 2 square regions covering each 1
6
of the sphere, conformed by
4 elementary regions.
The labeling of strategies 0 and 1, on the other hand, is arbitrary, and only diagonal
(symmetric) and nondiagonal (nonsymmetric) positions are distinguishable (if the game
is symmetric, this is a natural distintion). Then we would have 9 kinds of games, the
same result obtained by Rapoport and Guyer (1978) and Robinson (1998) for symmetric
games
It can be wise, however, to discriminate wether a certain diagonal P0 position (pure
or mixed) have higher or lower payoff than a certain NE position. This give us 12 kinds of
games.
7.1 ORDER GRAPHS
In a taxonomy of 2x2 games Rapoport and Guyer (1978), a very useful graph was pro-
posed, where all the possible outcomes of payoffs of the players are plotted, payoff of A
vs. payoff of B.
From these an order graph can be constructed that allows to find Nash Equilibrium
and Pareto optimal positions, as is shown in Robinson (1998). It can therefore be used as
a classification scheme for strictly-ordered-payoff games (where there are no two equal
elements in the payoff matrix).
To construct an order graph, the four points corresponding to the four positions are
connected with arrows when a player can unilaterally shift from one to other, and the
arrows point in the direction where the payoff is higher for the involved player.
If A’s payoff is plotted in the Y axis, then A’s arrows point allways upwards and B’s
arrows points allways to the right. Doing so, we get an order graph. In this order graph,a
Nash Equilibrium is a point where all the adjacent arrows point at.
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To find PO we draw arrows that point in the direction where the other player’s payof
is increased. We will call these arrows Pareto arrows. The points fulfilling PC are the
points where the Pareto arrows converge.Conversely, we will call the arrows ponting in
the direction where the own payoff increases Nash arrows.
As an example, the payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is given by:
B confesses B acuses A
A confesses
A acuses B
(
Moderate sentence Severee sentence
Freedom Lifetime sentence
) (11)
In figure 4 the order graph for this game is presented, where L=lifetime, S=severe, M=moderate
and F=freedom.
F
M
S
L
L S M F
B$
A$
M
F
S
L
L S M
$
$
F
B
A
Figure 4: Order Graph for the Prisoner’s dilemma with Nash arrows and Pareto arrows
If we transpose the payoff matrix, the Nash arrows turn into Pareto arrows, and we
get a different game. When we transpose, the axis are interchanged in the graphs, and
only arrows with negative slope change their direction. All the information we need to
characterize a game is in the Nash arrows. Moreover, if we mark the NE, we can infer the
directions of the arrows, and the game is completely determined.
For example: Let’s consider a game with payoff matrix
(
4 5
1 0
)
similar to the “Chicken
Game”. In figure 5 we show the Robinson graphs for the game and its transposed-matrix
game, and a simplified version of both graphs.
PNHM
M
H
N
P
PNHM
M
H
N
P
−→
PNHM
M
H
N
P
PNHM
M
H
N
P
Figure 5: Simplified Robinson Diagrams
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8 A LIST OF 2x2 NONZERO-SUM SYMMETRIC GAMES
In this work, a classification for these games is proposed where, as a first criterion, the
diagonal and non-diagonal NE are counted, resulting in three categories:
• Games with one diagonal NE (table 1)
• Games with two diagonal NE (table 2)
• Games with two non-diagonal NE (table 3)
PO $NE(diag) > $PO? # Triangles Fraction Diagram examples
is NE — 4 1
6
Cholesterol:
friend or foe∗
Ratliff (2003)
(
4 2
3 1
)
not NE Yes 2 112
Hershey’s kisses
Dehejla (2003),
Deadlock
Flitney and Abbot (2003)
(
3 4
1 2
)
not NE No 2 112
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Morris (1994)
(
3 1
4 2
)
Two† Yes 3 18
(
4 5
2 1
)
(
5 4
1 2
)
Two† No 1 124
(
3 5
2 1
)
Table 1: Games with one diagonal NE
Games with only one NE (table 1) are maybe the most studies among 2x2 symmetric
games. That is the reason for having three examples in table 1 with an own name.
∗ †
Games with two diagonal NE (table 2) have only one interesting feature: the equilib-
rium choice dilemma. There is, moreover, one only kind of games within this category.
Games with two nondiagonal equilibria (table 3) are interesting mainly because the
equilibrium choice dilemma is solvable by using mixed strategies. These games have a
stable mixed strategy NE. In this category we find the famous “Chicken Game”
∗Cholesterol: friend or foe is a game where the expected payoff matrix depends of a probability, and
can change between two extreme scenarios. The game referred corresponds to one of those scenarios.
†If two PO exist in these games, they can be both diagonal and non-diagonal. In the first case, the PO
position to be compared with the NE is the one that is not a NE, and in the second case what we compare is
a mixed strategies PO.
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PO # Triangles Fraction Diagram Example
Both NE 6 1
4
Pareto Coordi-
nation Game∗
GameTheory.net (2003)
(
4 1
2 3
)
(
5 1
4 3
)
(
5 1
3 2
)
Table 2: Games with two diagonal NE
PO $NE(mixed) > $PO? # Triangles Fraction Diagram examples
One Yes 1 1
24
(
3 2
5 1
)
One No 1 124
Chicken Game
Dehejla (2003)
(
4 2
5 1
)
Two — 4 16
(
2 3
4 1
)
Table 3: Games with two non-diagonal NE
9 CONCLUSIONS
The whole classification of games proposed here can be represented in a map of the
games as that shown in figure 6. This is a scheme of all triangular regions of the unfolded
unit cube where the G parameters of the payoff matrices can be projected.
To help the using of the map, some “canonical” payoff matrices are shown in the
vertexes of the triangles. Any payoff matrix can thus be decomposed in a trivial part (a
matrix with all its entries identical) and a convex combination of the canonical matrices in
the vertexes of the corresponding triangle.
The point in the unit cube representing a certain payoff matrix wil be nearer to the ver-
tex whose canonical matrix has a larger quoefficient in the decomposition. The distance
from each vertex is inversely proportional to the decomposition quoefficient, even though
there is an irrelevant overall scale.
Among the uses we can find for the map, the following are the most obvious:
• Compute the fraction of games having a certain feature.
• Check which changes in a payoff matrix can change the features of the game, and
how such features change.
• Find easily a payoff matrix to define a game with certain characteristics.
A good example to ilustrate the use of the map in figure 6 is the game “Cholesterol:
friend or foe”. This game have a payoff matrix that is a convex combination of two payoff
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G = −1B
AG = −1
AG = −1
G = 1B
G = 1A
G = −1B
G = 1B
AG =1
0 3
3 0
0 3
3 0
0 3
3 0
0 3
3 0
2 2
2 0
6  0
0  0
6  0
0  0 0 3
0 3
3 0
0 32 2
2 0 2 2
0 2
0 2
2 2
0 6
0 0
2 0
2 2
0 6
0 0
0 6
0 0
0 2
2 2
0 0
6 0 0 0
3 3
0 0
3 3
3 0
3 0
Figure 6: Map of all possible 2x2 symmetric games
matrices weighted by probabilities:
P =
(
9 15
5 7
)
P +
(
−9 −3
−1 1
)
(1− P ) (12)
We can decompose each matrix in the relevant and irrelevant part, and write the former
in terms of the “canonical” payoff matrices shown in the map. We obtain:
(
9 15
5 7
)
=
16
6
(
3
8
(
0 6
0 0
)
+
3
8
(
2 2
0 2
)
+
2
8
(
3 3
0 0
))
+
(
5 5
5 5
)
(13)
For cholesterol being healthy and
(
−9 −3
−1 1
)
=
6
24
(
2
24
(
0 0
0 6
)
+
4
24
(
0 0
3 3
)
+
18
24
(
0 2
2 2
))
+
(
−9 −9
−9 −9
)
(14)
For cholesterol being unhealthy.
Spanning the possible values of the probability P we move along the map as is shown
in figure 7
11
3 3
0 0
2 2
2 0
0 0
2 2
0 2
6 0 0 6
0 0
Figure 7: Position of “Cholesterol: frien or foe” for different p
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